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This paper will provide an evaluation of the self/Other Parity account, according 
to which introspection is an illusion and the data coming from it are unreliable for 
justifying theories. The paper will argue that the foundation of this account is based 
upon an a priori denial of the first-person perspective, considered as an obstacle to a full 
naturalization of psychology, that affects both the choice of the methods of inquiry and 
the interpretation of the empirical data.
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as a psychologist, i wonder why how the epistemological status of my 
discipline is still a matter of controversy. i think that the very question on 
the table is nothing but whether it is a naturalized science, a social science, 
or something hybrid between these two ones. i also think that researchers 
working in (experimental) psychology tend to consider themselves as 
natural scientists, no more and no less than physicists or biologists. in 
this sense, they tend to argue that their object of inquiry – the mind – 
is something inter-subjectively observable through inter-subjectively 
validated methods, no more and no less than what is argued by physicists 
or biologists. this approach can be called objective or third-person and has 
allowed psychology to gain results and credit. In this sense, it can be defined 
as a fruitful approach. but the open question here is whether this approach 
is completely true, that is, whether it tells the whole story about the mental. 
Personally, i think it does not and i want to face this problem by discussing a 
specific issue: the place of introspection in psychology.
I here define introspection as an empirical method of enquiry through 
which subjects are able to learn and then verbally report about their own 
currently going on, or very recently past, mental states (schwitzegebel 
2010). it is worth noting that, even though the term introspection rarely 
occurs in recent textbooks of psychology or research methodology 
(Hurlburt & Heavey 2001, p. 401), we can find traces of it under various 
aliases, such as verbal report or self-report, as stated more than sixty years ago 
by the historian of psychology e. boring (1953, p. 163). i am sure that those 
familiar with psychological literature have no difficulties to say that many 
experiments or review papers refer to data coming from verbal reports. 
The point is how researchers consider these data for the justification of 
their theories, especially in comparison with other kinds of evidence. 
my personal opinion is that verbal reports have no credibility among 
the majority of psychologists. For example, let us consider the following 
quotation from Philip Johnson-Laird, a prominent authority in the field.
it is impossible to establish the veridicality of subjective reports. at worst, 
they may be fraudulent […]; at best, they may be misleading, because none 
of us has access to the wellsprings of thought (Johnson-laird 2006, p. 27).
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as i said above, similar statements are quite common in psychological 
literature. these statements are formulated as showing a mere empirical fact 
generally accepted by the scientific community: introspection is a sort of 
illusion, since people have many mistaken notions about their introspective 
information and its value (Pronin 2009, p. 3). For example, in a documented 
review ranging from many research areas such as social psychology (ivi, 
pp. 15-26 and pp. 49-51), developmental psychology (ivi, pp. 45-46), and 
neuroscience (ivi, pp. 48-49), the psychologist Pronin reports a large body of 
empirical evidence that aims at demonstrating that the introspection illusion 
can be a source of danger, since it “causes problems. It can foster conflict, 
discrimination, lapses in ethics, and barriers to self-knowledge and social 
intimacy” (ivi, p. 2). on the basis of the results reported in the review, she 
individuates four components of the illusion (ivi, pp. 4-6):
1. introspective weighting: When people have to assess themselves, 
they generally tend to be too confident of their introspections.
2. self/other asymmetry: When people have to assess the others, 
they generally do not rely upon introspection.
3. behavioral disregard: People generally tend to disregard 
observable behavior when they have to assess themselves, and to take 
it in full consideration when they have to assess others.
4. differential evaluation: People generally tend to take into great 
account their own introspections and to underestimate those of the 
others.
as we can see, Pronin argues that introspection is a potential source of biases 
and errors (ivi, p. 15) and thus hopeless as a method of scientific inquiry. 
so, she derives the methodological claim of mistrusting introspection and 
verbal reports from a large body of empirical evidence. this methodological 
claim implies the preference for non-introspective methods of any sort in 
psychological research, such as behavior observation, non-conscious priming, 
and brain neuro-imaging “[…]in order to pursue the goal of understanding 
mental experience” (ivi, p. 55). thus, only third-person and inter-subjectively 
validated methods are allowed in the understanding of the mind: because of 
the biases and errors that introspection can provoke, researchers cannot trust 
what experimental subjects tell about their own point of view.
it is important to stress that, in order to qualify a method as introspective, 
it must meet, among the others, the so-called first-person condition. On 
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beliefs about one’s own mind and no one else’s (schwitzgebel 2010). in other 
words, this condition implies that, for making introspection, a person must 
adopt “[a perspective from which one thinks of oneself as an individual 
facing a world, as a subject distinct from everything else” (baker 1998, 
p. 328). this does not mean simply that a person must possess a certain 
perspective towards the world and her thoughts (ivi, pp. 328-329). rather, it 
means that she must possess the ability “to conceptualize the distinction 
between oneself and everything else there is” and “also to conceive of 
oneself as the bearer of those thought” (ivi, p. 330). that is, she must have a 
strong or robust (and not a weak or rudimentary) first-person perspective 
(baker 1998, pp. 331-332; baker 2013, pp. 147-150).
this implies that it is postulated an asymmetry between the way we can 
know our own mind and the way we can know others’ minds: people 
cannot directly know others’ minds through introspection, but they can 
indirectly know them only by making inferences from the observation of 
others’ overt behavior. In other words, because of the first-person condition, 
introspection provides a sort of privileged access to the mind: the owner of 
mental states can have a better understanding of them than other people 
and thus, at the methodological level, psychologists can trust her when 
they ask about what happens in her mind. however, it is clear that this 
picture clashes with the conclusions reached by researchers emphasizing 
the presence of an introspection illusion. in fact, if we take a look at the 
four components of the illusion above mentioned, it appears evident that 
it is the first-person point of view that leads people to commit evaluation 
and judgment errors and thus to make the data coming from introspection 
scientifically unreliable. Roughly speaking, the four components aim at 
showing that the first-person perspective is so entrenched in subjectivity 
that it can lead to give unreliable interpretations of both inner mental 
states and outer behavioral phenomena. For this reason, various researchers 
appear to endorse a position that is counterintuitive from the standpoint 
of common sense: the so-called self/other Parity account. this account 
points out that people can have a reliable and adequate comprehension of 
their own mind only on the basis of the same processes through which they 
acquire knowledge of the others’ minds rather than through introspection. 
thus, according to the simplest version of the self/other Parity account, the 
first-person condition cannot be met (Schwitzgebel 2010): this means that 
reliable introspections cannot be met in any way and people can know both 
their own mental states and those of others only indirectly.
it is clear that these arguments echo the old criticisms moved by 
the psychologist Watson against the late 19th and early 20th century 
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introspectionism in his 1913 behaviorist manifesto. however, i think it 
would be quite unfair to define the supporters of the Self/Other Parity 
account as behaviorists, in spite of the similarities between them. in one of 
the most important contributions in favor of the self/other Parity account, 
the developmental psychologist gopnik strongly rebuts the charge of re-
proposing a version of the old-fashioned behaviorism. in fact, differently 
from behaviorists, she stresses that internal psychological states do exist 
and that the discovery of their nature is the very aim of psychology: in this 
sense, the Self/Other Parity Account can be defined as a truly mentalist 
approach. she goes further by pointing out that there are also “[…] full, rich, 
first-person psychological experiences of the Joycean and Woolfian kind” 
(gopnik 1993, p. 12). however, similarly to behaviorists, she points out that 
the first-person experiences cannot be considered as the genuine causes 
of people’s thoughts and behaviors: this is so because first, people have 
internal psychological states, observe the behaviors and the experiences 
they lead to both in themselves and others; second, they build up theories 
about the causes of those behaviors and experiences that postulate the 
adoption of the first-person perspective; third, as a consequence, they 
experience the first-person perspective. This position is close to that 
proposed in one of the most-cited and controversial papers in psychology, 
that is, nisbett and Wilson 1977, as explicitly claimed by gopnik (1993, 
p. 9). The crucial argument of Nisbett and Wilson article can be briefly 
summarized in the two following points (Wilson 2002, p. 106):
1. most emotions, judgments, thoughts, feelings, and behaviors 
are caused by an unconscious mind – in gopnik terms, the internal 
psychological states.
2. Because people cannot have any conscious and first-person 
access to the unconscious mind, the conscious mind confabulates 
reasons – in gopnik terms, build up theories – to explain emotions, 
judgments, etc.
a famous example in support of nisbett and Wilson’s view comes from 
the results of a selection task in which the participants were required to 
choose between four consumer products that were actually identical and 
to verbally justify their choice (nisbett & Wilson 1977, pp. 243-244; see also 
newell & shanks 2014, p. 5). as a result, it was found that the participants 
tended to select the right-most of the four alternatives without mentioning 
the position as a justification of their choice. Rather, for this justification, 
they built up a theory based upon certain attributes of the chosen product. 
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thus, according to nisbett and Wilson, the subjects’ missed report about 
position effects on choice is evidence in favor of the dissociation between 
(unconscious) third-person psychological states and (conscious) first-person 
psychological experiences.
i think that the quotation of Johnson-laird proposed above follows the same 
line of reasoning of gopnik and nisbett and Wilson: most of our mental life 
is unconscious and, since verbal reports are not the product of any genuine 
introspection, but rather post-hoc theories of what is supposed to happen 
in the mind, they cannot be considered as reliable tools in psychological 
research. thus, the self/other Parity account appears to deny the use of 
introspective reports in the justification of psychological theories because 
they are irremediably biased by the subject’s first-person point of view. In 
this sense, such a point of view seems to preclude the possibility to have 
reliable data at disposal.
What amazes me of the literature in favor of the self/other Parity account 
is the amount of empirical evidence reported for its justification (see 
nisbett & Wilson 1977; gopnik 1993; Wilson 2002; Pronin 2009). in this sense, 
as i pointed out above, the prevalence of an unconscious mind over the 
conscious appears to be an empirically well-grounded scientific theory. In 
fact, the claim that our unconscious mental states play a significant role 
in the determination of thoughts and behaviors seems to be empirically 
confirmed and generally accepted by the scientific community. However, all 
the scientific theories must be continually revised and put into question and 
psychological ones are not exceptions. recently, the psychologists newell 
and shanks have proposed a critical review of the role of the unconscious 
mind on decision-making and have reached conclusions different from 
those of the supporters of the self/other Parity account. the focus of their 
work is on the methods used to test whether experimental subjects are 
conscious or not of the mental processes involved in the determination of 
behavior during decision-making tasks (newell & shanks 2014, pp. 1-2). they 
point out that, in decision-making tasks, it is made a comparison between 
a behavioral performance and a conscious assessment based on subjects’ 
verbal reports (ivi, p. 3): researchers infer that a mental state occurs 
unconsciously if the subjects’ behavioral performance is clearly guided 
by this mental state but their verbal reports do not reflect it in any way. 
according to their proposal, in order to be reliable in assessing the presence 
or the absence of consciousness, a test must meet four criteria (ivi, pp. 3-4, 
table 1):
3. 
Is the Empirical 
Evidence in 
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a. reliability: the assessment test must be unaffected by those factors that do not 
influence the behavioral performance.
b. relevance/information: the assessment test must consider only the amount of 
information relevant to the behavioral performance or the decision in question.
c. immediacy: the assessment test must occur concurrently or as soon as possible 
after the behavioral performance to avoid possible lapses or distortions.
d. sensitivity: the assessment test should occur under optimal retrieval 
conditions.
it is important to note that the idea behind their criteria for assessing 
consciousness dates back to two papers written by shanks himself and the 
psychologist st. John in 1994 and in 1997. in these papers, shanks and st. 
John provide a criticism to what they call the Thesis of implicit Knowledge and 
learning, according to which the most of people’s knowledge is the primary 
cause of their behavior but it cannot be represented into consciousness. 
Further, also the learning of this knowledge takes place unconsciously both 
at the time of learning and at the time of retrieval (st. John & shanks 1997, 
p. 164). according to their criticism, most studies in favor of the thesis of 
implicit Knowledge and learning use invalid tests of consciousness, that 
is, tests clearly violating criteria (b) and (d) listed above (shanks & st. John 
1994, pp. 73-75 and p. 377; st. John & shanks 1997, p. 167). For this reason, 
they conclude that the empirical evidence in favor of the thesis of implicit 
Knowledge and Learning is not as grounded as it might appear at a first 
sight (shanks & st. John 1994, p. 367 and p. 394; st. John & shanks 1997, pp. 
162-163). in this sense, the paper by newell and shanks 2014 can be seen as 
an application of shanks and st. John’s (1994 and 1997) work to the area of 
decision-making – where the thesis of implicit Knowledge and learning 
seems to be prevalent. however, the 2014 paper goes beyond the conclusions 
reached in the 1994 and 1997 papers. in fact, in the older articles, shanks 
and st. John aim only to show that the reviewed studies using tests of 
consciousness violate the criteria (b) and (d). instead, in the newer article, 
newell and shanks also show that the studies using tests of consciousness 
that respect the four criteria above described “either demonstrate directly 
that behaviour is under conscious control or can be plausibly explained 
without recourse to unconscious influences” (Newell & Shanks 2014, p. 19).
thus, the points moved by shanks and colleagues seem to overturn the 
picture sketched by the supporters of the self/other Parity account. in fact, 
at the empirical level, they argue that the data coming from verbal reports, 
if adequately treated, cannot be defined as illusory or confabulatory in 
any way and can be legitimately used for justifying psychological theories. 
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instead, at the theoretical level, the mind seems to be much more conscious 
and introspectively accessible to a first-person perspective than many 
researchers can think, and the appeal to the unconscious in psychological 
theories often appears not to be justified.
now it is time to go back to the starting questions: should introspection and 
the data coming from it be eliminated from psychology? should the methods 
of inquiry of psychology be limited only to the third-person and objective/
inter-subjective ones? is psychology a naturalized science? We have seen 
that shanks and colleagues’ work casts doubts on the supposed unreliability 
of the data coming from introspection and on the claim that most of the 
mind is unconscious (newell & shanks 2014, pp. 18-19). i think that their 
arguments are compelling and that the four criteria they propose should be 
met in the construction of every test for assessing consciousness. Personally, 
I think that these criteria are reasonable and not so difficult to be met 
and can provide a useful guide for evaluating the validity of the results of 
psychological research.
i believe that the most relevant conclusion of shanks and colleagues’ work 
can be summarized in this way: researchers should start to take subjects’ 
introspective or verbal reports much more seriously than they actually do. 
however,  to do this, they should also assume that the subject is able to adopt 
a first-person perspective allowing her to access her own mental states. 
this assumption seems to clash with the possibility of using only objective/
inter-subjective and third-person methods for assessing psychological facts. 
that is, if we take a look all along the newell and shanks 2014 review, we can 
find that sometimes the authors must focus upon the single data obtained 
from a single participant for assessing their degree of consciousness and 
not only upon the results of the overall sample of subjects. this is clear, 
for example, in one of the studies that they review – and one of the few 
ones respecting the four criteria above discussed – that is, the maia and 
mcclelland 2004 paper on the re-examination of the damasio’s somatic 
Marker Hypothesis, specifically when they discuss the results of two single 
participants, respectively number 36 and number 41 (maia & mcclelland 
2004, pp. 4-5). As we can see, the adoption of the first-person perspective 
seems to imply the adoption of methods typical of an idiographic approach. 
this means that the primary goal of verbal or introspective reports is to 
provide an accurate description of a particular person’s experiences, no 
matter whether they can be similar to or different from some or most other 
people’s experiences (hurlburt & akhter 2006, p. 274). of course, this does 
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at being nomothetic, objective/inter-subjective, and based on the average 
responses of a large sample of individuals to the introduction of some 
experimental manipulation in comparison with the response to certain 
control conditions (hurlburt & akhter 2006, p. 297; barlow & nock 2009, p. 
19). to put it in another way, psychology cannot be limited to the study of 
the (universal) unconscious and sub-personal mechanisms necessary for 
a first-person perspective because the knowledge of these mechanisms 
cannot “supplant or replace knowledge of phenomena that the mechanisms 
make possible” (baker 2007, p. 206). Personally, i do not want to argue 
that psychology should rebut the nomothetic approach in favor of the 
idiographic one: i believe that these two approaches should be viewed as the 
methodological legs of psychology, in spite of their irreconcilable differences, 
aims, and historical and philosophical traditions they come from (see von 
Wright 1971, chapter 1). thus, in my opinion, the denial of one of these two 
methodological tenets would lay psychology on the line to be incomplete. 
however, it is important to stress that these two approaches appear to 
be difficult to conciliate, since the explanations used in the idiographic 
approach cannot leave aside the adoption of the first-person perspective 
(see baker 1998, pp. 336-337) and those used in the nomothetic one seem to 
work exclusively in a third-person perspective.
in conclusion, shanks and colleagues’ papers above considered suggest 
that there are no empirical reasons to reject the idea of a central role of the 
conscious mind in psychology. this is because the empirical results in favor 
of the unconscious mind appears to be theoretically affected by naturalistic 
presuppositions a priori dismissing the first-person perspective. Now, the 
question at play is no more empirical but philosophical/logical: can a 
naturalistic framework be a proper account for psychology? more precisely, 
if the acceptance of the first-person perspective appears to be undeniable 
for psychology, does the naturalism have the resources for coherently 
dealing with it? if not, the consequence should be to renounce to an idea of 
psychology as a fully naturalized science (see baker 1998, pp. 336-337 and 
pp. 342-343 and baker 2007) and to radically revise and reinterpret many 
psychological concepts and constructs.
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